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           This paper analyzes whether the new business segment reporting disclosure 
rules, SFAS 131, will actually provide capital market participants with more 
predictive ability than the previous rules.  For this we conduct three experiments. Two 
experiments with advanced accounting students as subjects, where the experiments 
differ in the firm the subjects analyze, and the third with professional financial 
analysts. In each experiment we provide one group of subjects with accounting 
reports based on the new standard (New Rules Group, NRG), and another group with 
reports based on the old standard (Old Rules Group, ORG). We ask both groups to 
forecast several accounting and market values of a firm. We then compare the 
performance predictions and analyses of the two groups.  
Most of the forecasts of the NRG are neither significantly different from those 
of the ORG, nor significantly more accurate. Subjects also report the variables that 
they consider important in their analysis. 25% of the NRG students in Experiment I 
mention the segment data as being central in their decisions and 33% say they used 
segment or sector data. Among the analysts in Experiment II the corresponding 
percentages are 0% and 60%, respectively. Also in experiment III, where the subjects 
rank the top 4 variables they use in their predictions according to importance, segment 
repots receive a mediocre rank. It therefore appears that the reports according to the 
new rules, whereas noticeable by the subjects, do not have a major positive impact on 
their responses. The subjects also exhibit a considerable degree of overconfidence.  
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As of December 1997 companies have been required to report on the various 
segments of their business in compliance with the new standard SFAS 131 (FASB, 
1997), replacing the previous standard FAS 14 (FASB, 1976). According to the new 
standard, companies are required to disclose specific information regarding the 
various segments of their operations, according to ‘the managerial approach’. That is, 
if senior company management makes decisions based on separate reports of certain 
business segments, then these are the business segments on which the company is 
required to report in their financial statements. Consequently, the determination of the 
classification of the business segments, for reporting purposes, is not left to the 
discretion of companies’ managements but must be made according to the internal 
structure of the firm. This type of reporting represents a significant departure from the 
traditional accounting reporting regulations, which require uniform measurement and 
reporting policies for all companies. The objective of the new standard, and the 
deviation from the common reporting practices was “to meet the demand of all those 
who make use of financial statements to receive high quality information regarding 
companies, in order to make sound investment-related decisions” (FASB, 1997) 
              SFAS 131 is potentially of great importance in enhancing the information 
content of financial reporting, as it requires more detailed information on the different 
activities of the firms, but the greater detail may increase data collection costs. The 
additional disclosures also impose higher costs on the market participants (investors 
and analysts) reviewing them, as the amount of information increases. In addition to 
requiring more detailed reporting, it also changed the basis of reporting to a 3
management-based reporting instead of the traditional reporting standard. One may 
therefore wonder if the new standards are worth the potential costs and the deviations 
from the traditional reporting systems. 
Prior to the implementation of the new rules, several authors tried to predict 
the effect of several types of segment reports on investors and firms’ behavior (see 
Arnold, Holder, and Mann, 1980, Balakrishnan, Harris, and Sen, 1990, Boatsman, 
Behan, and Patz, 1993, Harris, 1998, Hermann and Thomas, 1997, Hopkins, 1996, 
Maines, McDaniel, and Harris, 1997, Nagarjan and Sridhar, 1996, and Otley and 
Dias, 1982). After the implementation of the new rules, several studies analyzed their 
impact on the quality of financial reporting (see Bar-Yosef and Venezia, 2002, Berger 
and Hann 2003, Ettredge, Kwon, and Smith 2002a, 2002b, Hermann and Thomas, 
2000, Street, Nichols, and Gray, 2000, Nichols, Bishop, and Street, 2002, Behn, 
Nichols, and Smith, 2002). By and large it has been found that as a consequence of 
the new rules, corporations are reporting higher number of segments than previously, 
and that the reports they issue are clearer and more detailed.  
             The objective of this paper is to shed more light on a question not heretofore 
addressed: would the new reporting system provide more predictive ability than the 
previous one The ultimate test of the superiority of the new system over the old one is 
in determining whether “after all is said and done” do investors’ forecasts become 
more accurate due to the new rules. A straightforward way to test this hypothesis 
would be to compare the accuracy of analysts’ predictions prior to 1998 and after it, 
that is, before and after the adoption of the new reporting rules. Since it is practically 
impossible to control for all other effects that occurred prior and after the 
implementation of SFAS 131 (although attempts were made to control for some of 
them, see Venkataram, 2001), such a test would only be partially accurate. We 4
therefore propose an experimental approach for tackling this problem in which we 
could isolate the affect of the change in the reporting rule on the accuracy of 
predictions.  
Investors are often affected by overconfidence (see Barber and Odean, 1999). 
We therefore investigate whether such a phenomenon exists also in the current study. 
Although overconfidence would not directly interfere with the usefulness of business 
segment reporting, overconfidence may sometimes lead to the disregard of 
information, and in our case, to the overlooking of relevant segment data.  
The article is organized in the following manner: in Section II we discuss the 
method of analysis. In Section III the subjects are described, and in Section IV we 
review the procedures of the experiment. The results are presented in Section V, and 
concluding remarks are given in Section VI. 
 
II. Method 
  We first present, in subsection II.1, a short model that discusses the effect of 
segment reports on the accuracy of predictions. This model provides some 
background for understanding the nature of possible advantages and disadvantages of 
segment reports for forecasting efficiency. In the second subsection we present our 
experimental method. 
    
II. 1. Theoretical Model of Segment Reporting Effects on Predictions 
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Consider a firm with n segments. Let Pit denote the profits of the firm’s i
th 
segment.
1 Let Pt denote the total profits of the firm so that:  
Pt  = S Pit              (1) 
Assume the investor needs to estimate P t+1 , and that  
P i,t+1 = Pit (1 + git) + eit          (2) 
where git is the rate of growth of segment i, and eit denotes random noise. 
It then follows that: 
Pt+1 = S Pit (1 + git) + S eit  = S Pit  + S Pit git + S eit 
               = Pt + S Pit git +  et           (3) 
where  et denotes the sum of the  eit 's. 
Let  ˆ P t+1  denote the estimate at time t of Pt+1.  Given segment data this estimate can 
be given by: 
ˆ P t+1 (segments)  =  Pt + S Pit git        (4)  
Without segment reports the estimate at time t of Pt+1 is given by: 
ˆ P t+1 (no segments)  =  Pt + Pt gt        (5) 
where gt is the estimate of total profits growth rate, gt. 
The better can the investor estimate the git’s the more accurate will the 
estimates of the future total profits be. Segment reports, providing separate data on 
each segment can theoretically provide better estimates of the future profits since they 
allow greater detail.  
In practice however, there are several factors that may prevent the segment 
data from yielding better estimates. First, the investor may not use the information. 
Second, the variation in the git’s between the segments may be small so that detailed 
information about each of the segments may be of little consequence. Third, the eit’s 
                                                 
1 The analysis of this subsection is framed in terms of profits, P, but it applies also to any other 
forecasted variable. 6
may be negatively correlated so that total profits may be less volatile than the profits 
of each separate segment and hence, unless the investor takes this into account, using 
the segment reports may yield worse estimates than using the aggregate data. The 
efficacy of segment reports depend on all of the above factors, which are not easy to 
disentangle. We get however some evidence concerning the relative importance of 
these factors by considering two firms in the analysis, one with smaller and one with 
larger differences between their segments, and by analyzing to what extent do 
subjects attach importance to the segment data.
2   
In the following sub-section we present our method for examining the 
accuracy of predictions.  
 
II. 2. The Experimental Method  
Subjects were required to play the roles of investors who had to provide 
prediction of key accounting numbers of a firm (see Appendix A for the exact 
description of their task). To help them in their forecasts we supplied the subjects with 
all the relevant public data that would normally be available to investors. The 
variables they were asked to forecast were: Net Income (NI), Earnings Per Share 
(EPS), Profit Margin (average), Assets Turnover (average), and  Stock Price 
(average). In each experiment the subjects were divided into two groups. One group 
received annual financial reports which include SFAS 131 data (New Rules Group, 
NRG), and the other group, of a similar size and type of subjects, received the reports 
based on the old business segments reporting rules (Old Rules Group, ORG). In order 
not to give away the purpose of the experiment, we assigned the two groups different 
names and told the subjects that they were analyzing different firms. We tried to lead 
                                                 
2 These factors are of course related as there is a higher chance the investors will consider the segment 
reports important if the difference between the segments are considerable.  7
the subjects to believe that their assignment was a run-of-the-mill forecasting task. In 
order to disguise the identity of the firm we scaled down all volume and numbers 
(accounting and other) by a suitable factor, retaining ratios intact. 
We employ actual firms and financial reports so as to mimic real life as much 
as possible. Three experiments were conducted. In Experiments I and II (analyzing 
"Guess") the subjects differ in their background and occupation but they make 
predictions for the same firm. In Experiment III (analyzing "Sony") the subjects are 
similar to those of Experiment I, but they make predictions for a different firm. 
Within each experiment we compare the predictions of the NRG to those of 
the ORG to test for the effect of the new rules. Comparisons between Experiment I 
and II shed light on the effects of the types of investors groups (professional analysts 
vs. "market participants"). Comparisons between Experiment I and III help 
understand the effects of the firms analyzed. We picked Guess at random, where our 
criterion for choosing this firm was that they changed the number of reported 
segments  from 1 to 3 (Wholesale, Retail, and Concessions) after  the introduction of 
the new rules.
3 We picked  Sony since the operating segment information reported 
under SFAS 131 (provided to the NRG) differs remarkably from that reported under 
FAS 14 (provided to the ORG). Under FAS 14 the Game business was included in the 
Electronics segment, but is reported separately under SFAS 131. Under FAS 14 the 
Music and Pictures businesses were combined in the Entertainment segment, and the 
                                                 
3 The New Rules Group analyzing Guess thus received data that are more informative in the strict 
Blackwell, 1953, sense. Bar-Yosef and Venezia, 2002, have shown that with SFAS 131 firms usually, 
but not always, provide more informative (in the above sense) reports. Sometimes they provide either 
the same information as with SFAS 14, or a different partition of the information. 
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company's financing operations, which were in the Insurance segment, are included in 
the "Other" segment under SFAS 131.





Fifty-six fourth year accounting students at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, aged 
24 years or older, participated in the study. Twenty-four were randomly allocated to 
NRG and thirty-two to ORG. In order to ease the burden of the task, which is quite 
complicated, the subjects were grouped into teams of two, thus resulting with 12 
teams in the NRG and 16 teams in the ORG. During the fourth year of their studies all 
accounting students at the university (and hence all subjects) prepare for the CPA 
exams, after graduating with a B.A., and having taken all of the required accounting 
and finance classes including Financial Statement Analysis course. The subjects were 
therefore one semester away from becoming CPAs. Few weeks prior to the 
experiment, they learned in class on both FAS 14 and FASB 131, including the 
required disclosure and the economic motives for these rules. Thus, the background of 
the subjects is quite close to that of real financial analysts and in terms of formal 
education their knowledge may exceed that of most analysts. We therefore believe 
that the subjects are located at the middle to upper level of the spectrum of capital 
market sophistication.  
Experiment II 
Ten analysts, 27 years or older, employed by four different accounting firms or 
brokerage houses participated in the experiment. They are all experienced analysts, 
                                                 
4 Incidentally, the questionable segments reports of Sony in 1994  received major media attention, and 
provided an impetus for the introduction of  SFAS 131.When it was disclosed in November 1994 that 
Sony's movies business which were then part of the entertainment segment suffered major losses 
hidden behind  the strong performance of Sony's music department, also within the entertainment 
segment, Sony's stock price fell by 5%. 9




Sixty two fourth year accounting students at the Hebrew University of 
Jerusalem similar to those described in Experiment I participated in the study. The 
experiments were conducted however in different years, and different firms were used 
in these experiments. Thirty students were assigned to the NRG and 32 to the ORG. 
As in Experiment I they were required to work in teams of 2, thus giving us 15 teams 
for NRG and 16 for ORG.  
 
IV. Procedure  
 
In all experiments the data were provided in the form of a questionnaire which 
detailed the task the subjects had to perform and the incentives to perform well (see 
Appendix A). We also provided them with accounting and market data that should 
assist them in their forecasts. We supplied the subjects with previous income 
statements, balance sheets, and relevant excerpts from the 10K reports. We also 
provided them with share price history, beta, and some industry highlights. Both 
groups received the same questionnaire, but the NRG received data which included 
the supplements on segments as required by SFAS 131, and the ORG received similar 
data with the exception of not receiving the business segment supplements.  
In Experiments I, an independent instructor who is neither the class instructor 
nor a coauthor of this paper randomly distributed the questionnaires in class and  




                                                 
5 It should be noted that the nature of the experiment is demanding in terms of both effort and time. 
Therefore, firms employing analysts were not always cooperative, as the required input needed to be 
committed by each analyst to perform the required tasks were not trivial.    10
teams within each group, in terms of closeness of their results to the true results, will 
receive cash prizes of $300, $200, and $100, respectively, and that their superior 
performance will be announced. In addition to the monetary gain, the competitive 
nature of the students led us to believe that the subjects will make hard efforts to do 
well. Because of the considerable effort and time required to fulfill the task the 
subjects were permitted to take the data home and were allowed a week to hand in 
their results. They were told that collusion is forbidden, and violators will be harshly 
disciplined.
6 The type of the reward was such that teams had little incentive to 
cooperate. Experiment III was handled similarly except that we changed the nature of 
the rewards, providing the top 3 teams extra points towards their grade. These rewards 
generated similar interest in the experiment as those given in Experiment I. 
A similar procedure was used for experiment II with the following differences. 
First, the questionnaires were sent to the supervisors of the analysts in their work 
place who in turn explained the task to the subjects. Second, the subjects in this 
experiment worked individually rather than in teams as this is their typical work 
setting . They were promised prizes of $500 for the top three performers in each 
group, and they were also told that their forecasts accuracy ranking will be disclosed. 
These two incentives led us to believe that the analysts were supposed to do their 
best
7.  
To provide some validation checks and ascertain that the subjects understood 
the task, we asked them to report the values of the estimated variables for the last two 
years for which they had data. Since this information appeared in the footnotes and in 
the auxiliary reports that we provided the subjects, they should have answered these 
questions correctly if the material was studied carefully. Their answers were generally 
                                                 
6 In retrospect, as shall be shown bellow, the large variance of answers points to little or no collusion.   
7 Indeed, the supervisors of these analysts informed us, when the filled questionnaires were turned-in,  
that each analyst worked for several hours on performing the required tasks. 11
correct or very close to the actual ones so that we could conclude that the subjects 
indeed thoroughly read and comprehended the material and understood what their 
required task was.
8  
To test for overconfidence, the subjects were asked to give 95% confidence 
intervals for three of the variables forecasted: Net Income, EPS, and Share Price. We 
then calculated the number of intervals that covered the true values. Since 95% 
confidence intervals are supposed to cover the true values in 95% of the cases, then, if 
the provided intervals cover the true values in less than 95% of the cases this may be a 
sign of overconfidence (see Alpert and Raiffa, 1982). To examine whether the 
subjects understood what a confidence interval means (although it was explained in 
class) they were asked to answer the question: “what is the chance the EPS will 
exceed the upper bound of the 95% confidence interval you suggested for this 
variable?” Since they provided a 95% confidence interval for EPS, the correct 
response is 2.5%.  
 
V. Results and Discussion 
Experiment I 
The predictions of the two groups, the true values of the variables predicted, and the 
accuracies of the predictions are presented in Tables 1 (for the NRG) and Table2 (for 
the ORG). We calculated the accuracy as the root mean squared error (RMSE) as 
follows: for each variable t, predicted by team i, we define the prediction by Xit, the 
true value by Pt, and the error by:
 9  
   eit = (Xit-Pt) / Pt                (6) 
                                                 
8 For example, out of 28 groups, 19 provided the correct answers to EPS for 1998, 4 groups were 
within .1of the correct answer, 3 were within .2 and only one group, that eventually provided the worst 
estimates gave an incorrect answer. 
9 An additional index for the group (old rules vs. new rules) could be added, but this would 
unnecessarily complicate the notation. 12
 
The accuracy of predictions of team  i is then calculated as the root of mean squared 
errors: 




          (7) 
where T is the number of variables forecasted (since there are 5 variables T=5).  
The predictions of the teams are presented according to a descending order of 
accuracy (ascending RMSEi’s). The average accuracy of the NRG is 46.25%, and that 
of the ORG is 49.8%. The accuracies of the two groups seem at first glance quite 
close, and indeed a t-test could not show a significant difference between them. One 
observes, however, major differences in the dispersion of the accuracies of predictions 
within each group. Whereas the RMSEs of the NRG range between 10.67%, and 
73.02%, the RMSEs of the ORG range between 28.89% to 66.66%. The new 
reporting system provides “more information”, however the additional data may 
create an “information overload” on boundedly rational investors. This may lead the 
NRG to provide on average more accurate but more disperse predictions. 
In addition to determining the accuracy of predictions of each analyst we 
calculated the accuracy of prediction of each variable (averaged over the different 
analysts). That is, we calculated: 




          (8) 
Where N denotes the number of teams (12 for the NRG, and 16 for the ORG). 
   Descriptive statistics on the RMSEt s for the NRG and for the ORG are 
presented in Panels B of Tables 1 and 2, respectively. Differences between the groups 
are presented in Table 3. The RMSEt’s for the NRG are smaller than their 
counterparts of the ORG for the following variables: Net Income, Average stock 
Price, and Asset Turnover, but larger for EPS and Earnings/Sales. The average RMSE 13
t over the five variables is smaller for Old Rules Group mainly because of its 
considerable higher accuracy in the profit margin (Earnings/Sales) variable (9.9% vs. 
39.1%). In the other variables (except for EPS where the accuracies were close) the 
New Rules Group had an advantage.
10  
We also compare the forecasts between groups. Errors in forecasting could be 
due to some unexpected changes in the financial data that would affect both groups 
similarly, and hence the size of errors does not implicate any financial data set. 
However, small or no differences between forecasts between the groups would 
indicate that the different data sets the groups receive does not matter that much and 
that the different disclosure rules do not impact the forecasts considerably. To test for 
this we conduct t-tests for the five variables forecasted (see Table 3). It turns out that 
for all five variables there are no significant differences between the groups at the 5% 
level (Net income is higher for the NRG at the 10% level). It appears, therefore, that 
the additional information provided by the new rules does not have a major effect on 
the predictions. 
To further test the effects of the new rules we also ask the subjects to list the 
variables that they find to be most useful in their forecasts. Since this question is an 
open one, we received a great many different variables being labeled important. The 
variables deemed important most often were the variables usually used in analysis 
such as profitability, liquidity, sales, previous stock prices, and industry comparable 
variables. It turned out, however, that only three teams (out of the 12 that received 
segment reports) listed the segment part as important.
 11 One team reported that it used 
data on each of the segments in its forecasts. 
                                                 
10 All variables were underestimated. This however may be due to the nature of the year analyzed 
where the stock market and Guess performed exceptionally well. 
11 These teams were 11, 14, and 22 of The New Rules Group. They did not do better than the other 
groups accuracy-wise (See Table 1). 14
To test for overconfidence the subjects were asked to give confidence intervals 
for three variables: Earnings, EPS, and Stock Price. Their responses are presented in 
Tables 4 (NRG), and Table 5 (ORG). In the last column of these tables we record the 
subjects’ answer to the question: “what is the chance the EPS will exceed the upper 
bound of the 5% confidence interval you suggested for this variable?” As can be 
observed from this column, only few subjects answered this question right (2.5%), but 
it seems the subjects had a loose understanding of the notion of confidence intervals. 
One notes from these tables that only 7% (6 out of 84) of the confidence intervals 
(marked in bold) cover the true values. Since 95% confidence intervals are supposed 
to cover the true values 95% of the time and in the present experiment they covered 
the true values less than 10% of the time, it appears the subjects chose too narrow 
intervals, possibly as a result of overconfidence.  
We also compared the average width of the confidence interval the subjects 
chose with 2 X Standard Deviation of the variables. Under the assumption of 
normality, the subjects had to choose roughly such a width, to get the desired 
confidence interval. The average width the subjects provided was much smaller. The 
Standard deviation of EPS, share price, and net income of our firm, after adjusting for 
the scaling factor (1.3 for share price and net income), were: 0.16, 3.28, and 5,107, 
respectively, implying intervals of 0.32, 6.56, and 10,214. The average confidence 




The results of this experiment, presented in Tables 6-10, are in general quite 
similar to those of experiment I. We could have aggregated both experiments but we 15
found there are some insights to be obtained from comparing the different types of 
subjects. 
One notes from Tables 6,7, and 8 that the forecasts of the NRG and the ORG 
are quite similar. T-tests did not detect any significant difference between the 
forecasts of the two groups (see Table 8).
12 The overall accuracy of the NRG is 
somewhat lower than that of the ORG (average RMSE of 34.37% for the ORG vs. 
37.32% for the NRG), but this difference is neither statistically nor qualitatively 
significant. As in Experiment I the subjects were asked to list the variables they used 
and the variables they considered important. Whereas no subject listed the segment 
data as important, three out of the five subjects of the NRG reported that they used 
segment and or sector data. We therefore conclude that in the current experiment as in 
experiment I, there is no evidence for a significant improvement in forecasts due to 
the new rules. 
Similar to Experiment I the dispersion of the errors in the NRG is higher; the 
RMSE’s ranging in this group between 17.68% and 69.41% compared with RMSE’s 
ranging between 22.93% and 55.2% for the ORG. The subjects in Experiment II were 
also similar to those in Experiment I in exhibiting overconfidence. As can be observed 
from Tables 9 and 10, only one confidence interval (marked in bold in Table 10) out 
of the 30 provided covered the actual variable. 
The analysts' forecasts were a little more accurate than those of the students, 
as they underestimated the variables less than the students (see Table 11 for 
comparisons between the experiments). The higher overall accuracy is reflected in the 
lower RMSEs of the analysts as compared with the students (34.37% vs. 46.25% for 
the NRG, and 34.37% vs. 49.8%  for the ORG). Thus whereas we find some 
                                                 
12 Due to the small sample size the results of this experiment should be interpreted with caution. 16
differences in the accuracy of forecasts of Experiments I and II, possibly due to the 
different types of subjects, the effects of SFAS 131 on the subjects’ predictive ability, 




The results of this experiment are presented in Tables 12-14.
13 As in the previous 
experiments the differences between the NRG and the ORG are not striking. The 
RMSE's of the groups are 41.37% for the NRG, and 32% for the ORG, with a slight 
advantage for the ORG (see Tables 12 and 13). Another similarity with the previous 
experiment is the larger dispersion of the RMSE’s of the ORG (ranging between 8.6% 
and 64.8%), and that of the NRG (ranging between 17.29% and 57.44%). There are 
significant differences between the groups in the estimates of Net Income (p = 0.00), 
Average Stock Price (p = 0.03) and a considerable difference, albeit not statistically 
significant (p = 0.15) between their EPS estimates, where the ORG group's average 
estimates are more accurate (see Table 14).  Since the forecasts of the above three 
variables are correlated (as higher forecasts of Net Income lead to higher estimates of 
EPS and stock prices) it seems that the overall differences between the groups 
RMSE's result mainly from differences in their estimated profits. Given that the 
groups' estimates of the efficiency variables (the asset turnover ratio and the net profit 
margin) were very close (see Tables 12 and 13), the differences in estimated profits 
most likely resulted from differences in estimated total sales. 
  Subjects were also asked to rank the top 4 variables they used in their 
predictions according to importance (see parts "d" and “e” of Appendix A). The 
                                                 
13 We also conducted overconfidence test. Since the results are similar to those obtained for the 
previous experiments, we prefer not to present the results here to economize space. These results are 
available from the authors upon request. 17
results of the rankings are presented in Table 15. As in the previous experiments the 
segment reports received on average a lukewarm response.  
  The lower accuracy of the NRG forecasts is surprising. After all, this group 
received more detailed information than the NRG. They could reconstruct the data the 
ORG received, and move from there. However, a closer look at the data shows that 
the extra data may be confusing and may have caused the poorer estimates of the 
NRG. The variations in the rates of growth of the disaggregated segments is larger 
than those of the aggregated segments, and this may make the application of the 
disaggregated model (equation 4 in Section II.1) less accurate than the application of 
the aggregated model (equation 5 in Section II.1). To see this we present in Table 16, 
the sales of Sony for the years 1996, 1997, and 1998, and their rates of growth for the 
years 1997 and 1998.
14 The Disaggregated data, corresponding to SFAS 131, are 
presented in Panel A and the aggregated data, corresponding to FAS 14, in Panel B. 
We observe that in 1997 the disaggregated rates of growth, gi, range between 19.22% 
and 105.62%, whereas the aggregated gi's range between only 24.02% and 23.37%. In 
1998 the disaggregated gi's range between 13.52% and 46.66%, whereas the 
aggregates gi's range between 18.94% and 29.81%. 
15 This higher variability of the 
disaggregated segments may have contributed to the difficulties in predictions of the 
NRG.
16 
                                                 
14 Recall that it was previously argued that differences in sales forecasts probably account for the 
differences in the other variables forecasted.  
15 The effect of SFAS 131 on "Insurance" and "Other Segments" is ambiguous. For one, the financing 
operations were moved from "Insurance and Finance" under FAS 14 into "Other Segments". Thus, the 
Insurance segment under SFAS 131 provides a better picture of Sony's insurance operations, but poorer 
information on the other activities which under SFAS 131 also include financing operations. 
 
16 One may wonder why is it that in 1994 revelations on Sony’s different segments made a huge 
difference (as reported in a previous footnote), whereas here, in 1998, they had only a little impact.  In 
1994 however Sony had to disclose information they somehow (deliberately?) managed to keep away 
from the public, and the new segment information was combined with a huge write-off to Sony’s 
Goodwill.  18
  Why don't investors aggregate the disaggregated data if this may improve the 
forecasts? Our conjecture is reminiscent of the 1/N theory of Benartzi and Thaler, 
2001, who show that the menu of mutual funds provided to the investors affect their 
choice of risk. A similar bias may also exist here; investors might automatically apply 




In this article, we test experimentally the information implications on capital 
market participants of the new business segment reporting requirements SFAS 131. 
The forecasts obtained based on the new segment disclosure rules, were, marginally 
more accurate in two of the experiments, but less accurate in the third one, and the 
measures of accuracies of these forecasts were more disperse for the NRG subjects in 
all the experiments. These difference may be explained by the type of firm analyzed, 
where detailed information on diverse segments, as in the case of Sony, may have 
been more confusing than the aggregated data of former rules. In the case of Guess 
where the segments are quite similar, the segment reports enabled the subjects to 
marginally obtain better forecasts. In all the experiments the forecasts under the new 
rules were not radically different than those based on the old reporting rules.  
Our findings therefore indicate that the new reporting rules may have only 
modest informative benefits over the old ones. Since SFAS 131 led a large number of 
companies to increase the number of reported business segments, and assuming the 
costs associated with such disclosures are not trivial, the results of this study cast 
doubt on whether the information benefits of the new regulations outweigh their costs. 
Since we experimented with only two sets of firms, the results provided here are not 19
altogether conclusive. They point however to the need for a broader evaluation of the 





Alpert, M., and Howard Raiffa, (1982), “A Progress Report on the Training of 
Probability Assessors,” in D. Kahneman, P. Slovic and A. Tversky, eds., 
Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Arnold, J., W. W., Holder, and M. H., Mann, (1980), “International Reporting 
Aspects of Segment Disclosure”, International Journal of Accounting, fall 
125-135. 
Balakrishnan, R., T. S., Harris and P. K. Sen, (1990), “The predictive Ability of 
Geographical Segment Disclosures”, Journal of Accounting Research, 28, 
305-324. 
Barber, Brad M, and Terrance Odean, (1999), "The courage of misguided 
convictions", Financial Analysts Journal, 6, 41-55. 
Bar-Yosef, Sasson, and Itzhak Venezia, (2002), “The Implications of Standard SFAS 
131 on Segment Reporting on the Information Content of Financial Statements”, 
Forthcoming, The Accounting Journal (Israel). 
Behn, Bruce K., Nancy B. Nichols, and Donna L. Street, (2002), “The Predictive 
Ability of Geographic Segment Disclosures: SFAS 131 vs. SFAS 1, Journal of 
International Accounting Research, Forthcoming. 
Benartzi, Shlomo, and Richard Thaler (2001), Naïve Diversification Strategies in Defined 
Contribution Saving Plans, American Economic Review, 91(1), pp. 79-98. 21
Berger, Philip G. and Rebecca Hann, (2003), “The Impact of SFAS No. 131 on 
Information and Monitoring,” Vol 41, No 2, pp. 163-223. 
Blackwell, D., (1953), “Equivalent Comparison of Experiments”, Annals of 
Mathematical Statistics, 24, 265-272. 
Boatsman, J., B., Behan, and D. Patz, (1993), A Test of the Use of Geographical 
Segment Disclosures”, Journal of Accounting Research, (Supplement), 46-64. 
Ettredge, Michael, Soo Young Kwon, and David Smith, (2002a), “The Effect of 
SFAS 131 on number of Reported Business Segments,” Working paper, 
College of Business, Iowa State University. 
Ettredge, Michael, Soo Young Kwon, and David Smith, (2002b), “Proprietary Costs, 
Cross Segment Profit Smoothing, and the Impact of SFAS 131,” Working 
paper, College of Business, Iowa State University. 
Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB), (1976) Statement of Financial 
Standard No. 14:Financial Reporting for Segments of a Business Enterprise, 
Stamford, Conn. 
_____ , (1997) Statement of Financial Standard No. 131: Disclosures about Segments 
of an Enterprise and Related Information, Norwalk, Conn. 
Harris, M. S. (1998), “The Association between Competition and Managers’ Business 
Segment Reporting decisions,” Journal of Accounting Research, 36, 11-128. 
Herman, D., and W. B. Thomas, (1997), “Reporting Desegregate Information: A 
Critique Based on Concept Statement No. 2”, Accounting Horizons, 11, 35-44. 
Herman, D., and W. B. Thomas, (2000), “An Analysis of Segment Disclosure under 
SFAS No. 131 and SFAS No. 14”, Accounting Horizons, 14, 287-302. 22
Hopkins, P. E., (1996), “The Effect of Financial Statement Classification of Hybrid 
Financial Analysts’ Stock Price Judgments”, Journal of Accounting Research, 
34, Supplement, 33-50. 
Maines, L.A., L. S. McDaniel, and M. S. Harris, (1997), “Implications of Proposed 
Segment Reporting Standards for Financial Analysts’ Investment Judgments”, 
Journal of Accounting Research, 35, 1-33. 
Nagarjan, N., and S. Sridhar, (1996), “Corporate Response to Segment Disclosure 
Requirement”, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 21, 253-275.  
Nichols, Nancy B., Ashton C. Bishop, and Donna L. Street, (2002), “Segment 
Disclosures Under SFAS 131: Impact on the Banking Industry”, Working 
paper, Dayton University. 
Otley, D., and F. J. B. Dias, (1982), “Accounting Aggregation and Decision-Making 
Performance: An Experimental Investigation”, Journal of Accounting 
Research, 20, 171-188. 
Street, Donna L., Nancy B. Nichols, and Sidney J. Gray, (2000),“Segment 
Disclosures under SFAS 131: Has Business Segment Reporting Improved”? 
Accounting Horizons, 14, 259-285. 
Venkataraman, Rampogal, (2001), “ The Impact of SFAS 131 on Financial Analysts’ 
Information Environment”, Working paper, Pennsylvania State University 23
Table 1 
    Forecasts, Actual Values and RMSE's of Forecasts    
  New Rules Group, Students, Guess     
            
 Panel A : Forecasts by teams     
             











Team(i)  Income  Share  Price  Ratio  Margin  RMSEi 
             
18  31000  0.94  8.50  2.01  0.46  10.67% 
20  29646  0.60  5.60  1.59  0.36  28.23% 
12  22364  0.50  6.00  1.78  0.43  32.38% 
16  20000  0.60  5.60  1.61  0.34  34.56% 
17  17941  0.54  3.20  1.60  0.41  43.06% 
15  14400  0.35  5.95  1.80  0.37  43.46% 
21  12175  0.28  4.25  1.43  0.40  51.40% 
14  11173  0.26  3.53  1.77  0.39  53.43% 
13  15000  0.38  4.30  0.56  0.44  54.94% 
22  13496  0.31  3.45  1.77  0.04  64.67% 
11  13520  0.29  3.40  1.77  0.04  65.17% 
19  15066  -0.13  0.32  1.60  0.38  73.02% 
             
Avg. Forecasts  17982  0.41  4.51  1.61  0.34   
Actual Values  39900  0.93  9.00  1.90  0.45   
Average RMSE  46.25%           
             
  Panel B : Summary Statistics of Forecasts by Variable Forecasted 
             
Average  17982  0.41  4.51  1.61  0.34   
Std. Dev.  6600  0.26  2.03  0.36  0.14   
Median  15033  0.37  4.28  1.69  0.38   
Maximum  31000  0.94  8.50  2.01  0.46   
Minimum  11173  -0.13  0.32  0.56  0.04   









 Forecasts, Actual Values, and RMSE’s of Forecasts    
                 Old  Rules Group, Students, Guess     
            
 Panel A : Forecasts by teams     
             











Team(i)  Income  Share  Price  Ratio  Margin  RMSEi 
             
1  25540  0.60  5.50  1.74  0.42  28.89% 
2  18201  0.55  9.63  1.78  0.49  31.00% 
28  14476  0.39  6.63  1.67  0.41  40.95% 
4  17500  0.42  4.50  1.75  0.45  41.76% 
7  12169  0.32  6.23  1.69  0.47  45.26% 
25  11473  0.34  6.03  1.78  0.41  45.30% 
9  13500  0.31  6.03  1.30  0.41  46.83% 
3  11150  0.32  5.73  1.68  0.40  47.02% 
29  12941  0.30  5.50  1.50  0.40  47.32% 
10  23000  0.46    1.47  0.36  55.19% 
8  13921  0.32  9.19  0.14  0.41  58.67% 
5  10500  0.40  0.32  1.68  0.40  60.36% 
6  10500  0.40  0.30  1.70  0.40  60.40% 
26  11100  0.37  0.35  1.70  0.40  60.48% 
27  11933  0.40  5.20  0.15  0.41  60.76% 
23  8540  0.22    1.68  0.41  66.66% 
             
Avg. Forecasts  14153  0.38  5.08  1.46  0.41   
Actual Values  39900  0.93  9.00  1.90  0.45   
Average RMSE  49.80%           
             
  Panel B : Summary Statistics of Forecasts by Variable Forecasted 
             
Average  14153  0.38  5.08  1.46  0.41   
Std. Dev.  4692  0.10  2.94  0.53  0.03   
Median  12555  0.38  5.62  1.68  0.41   
Maximum  25540  0.60  9.63  1.78  0.49   
Minimum  8540  0.22  0.30  0.14  0.36   







  Inter Groups Differences in Forecasts and RMSEs ,  
Students, Guess 
           










  Income  Share  Price  Ratio  Margin 
           
Average  3828.97
*  0.03  -0.57  0.14  -0.08 
Std. Dev.  1908.25  0.16  -0.91  -0.17  0.11 
Median  2478.00  -0.01  -1.34  0.01  -0.02 
Maximum  5460.00  0.34  -1.13  0.23  -0.04 
Minimum  2633.00  -0.35  0.02  0.42  -0.32 
RMSE t   -8.4%  2.3%  -7.1%  -11.6%  29.2% 
           
Notes:           
The entries show the differences: new rules group minus old rules group 





Confidence Intervals, New Rules Group, Students, Guess 
 
 
               
  Panel A: Confidence Intervals 
               
  Net Income  EPS  Share Price  


















             
18  29500  32500  0.89  0.98  8.00  9.00  "Probable" 
20  19000  20900  0.40  0.65  5.4  6  9.00% 
12  19300  25428  0.42  0.58  5.2  6.8  2.50% 
16  18000  21000  0.40  0.65  5.3  5.9  10.00% 
17  20400  26320  0.42  0.57  4.9  6.9  NA 
15  12300  16500  0.29  0.41  5.7  6.2  17.00% 
21  10050  14300  0.23  0.33  4.1  4.4  15.00% 
14  8850  13496  0.21  0.31  2.75  6.21  "Low" 
13  11000  17000  0.20  0.65  2  8  2.50% 
22  11209  15783  0.25  0.37  2.52  6.33  "Minimal" 
11  11200  15783  0.25  0.36  2.54  6.23  0.00% 
19  11880  26752  -0.15  0.15  0.48  0.87  5.00% 
               
 Panel B: Summary Statistics     
               
Average  15224  20480  0.317  0.501  4.074  6.070  7.6% 
Std dev  6079  6045  0.238  0.222  2.067  1.989  6.2% 
Median  12090  18950  0.270  0.490  4.500  6.220  7.0% 
Maximum  29500  32500  0.890  0.980  8.000  9.000  17.0% 
Minimum  8850  13496  -0.150  0.150  0.480  0.870  0.0% 
Average Spread  5256    0.18    2.00 








Confidence Intervals, Old Rules Group, Students, Guess 
               
 Panel A: Confidence Intervals     
               
  Net Income  EPS  Share Price  


















               
1  22500  27500  0.52  0.64  2.00  7.00   
2  12128  24292  0.38  0.74  1.68  17.58  2.50% 
28  13328  15543  0.36  0.42  5.83  7.25  5.00% 
4  15000  20000  0.38  0.50  3.50  7.00  5.00% 
7  7666  16672  0.09  0.55  4.56  7.91  2.50% 
25  11187  11759  0.34  0.35  5.88  6.18  2.50% 
9  13000  14000  0.28  0.35  5.87  6.18  5.00% 
3  7700  16700  0.35  0.55  3.50  7.41  30.00% 
29  11731  14151  0.27  0.33  4.30  6.70  1.00% 
10  -66627  123400      0.00  19.56  "low" 
8  11990  17384  0.27  0.41  3.63  9.71  2.00% 
5  15000  20000  0.35  0.45  0.35  0.45  30.00% 
6  15000  20000  0.35  0.45  0.30  0.40  25.00% 
26  8000  17000  0.34  0.57  3.80  7.90  28.00% 
27  11480  17222  0.26  0.41  3.52  5.69  16.00% 
23  -11143  18223  0.00  0.43  0.10  2.32  2.50% 
               
 Panel B: Summary Statistics     
               
Average  6121  24615  0.30  0.48  3.05  7.45  11.2% 
Std dev  20590  26623  0.12  0.12  2.08  5.08  12.3% 
Median  11861  17303  0.34  0.45  3.51  7.00  5.0% 
Maximum  22500  123400  0.52  0.74  5.88  19.56  30.0% 
Minimum  -66627  11759  0.00  0.33  0.00  0.40  1.0% 
Average Spread  18494    0.17    4.40   




     
 
Forecasts, Actual Values, and RMSE's of    
Forecasts, New Rules Group, Analysts, Guess     
            
  Panel A : Forecasts by Subjects     
             











  Net Income  Share  Price  Ratio  Margin  RMSEi 
             
1  29000  0.69  8.00  1.80  0.44  17.68% 
5  20500  0.62  6.10  1.65  0.47  30.68% 
4  20500  0.62  6.00  1.65  0.47  30.92% 
2  18600  0.43  5.60  1.90  0.43  37.89% 
3  9870  0.29  2.76  3.67  0.40  69.41% 
             
Avg. Forecasts  19694  0.53  5.69  2.13  0.44   






         
             
   Panel B : Summary Statistics of Forecasts by Variable Forecasted 
             
Average  19694  0.53  5.69  2.13  0.44   
Std. Dev.  6812  0.17  1.88  0.87  0.03   
Median  20500  0.62  6.00  1.80  0.44   
Maximum  29000  0.69  8.00  3.67  0.47   
Minimum  9870  0.29  2.76  1.65  0.40   





   
 
   Forecasts, Actual Values, and RMSE's of Forecasts  
Old Rules Group, Analysts, Guess   
            
 Panel A : Forecasts by teams     
             











Margin  RMSEi 
             
1  26000  0.78  6.00  1.79  0.43  22.93% 
5  25000  0.75  4.50  1.80  0.40  29.68% 
2  21000  0.48  7.56  1.60  0.44  31.89% 
4  21258  0.60  5.48  1.65  0.47  32.14% 
3  5290  0.16  6.55  1.85  0.40  55.20% 
             
Avg. Forecasts  19710  0.55  6.02  1.74  0.43   






         
             
  Panel B : Summary Statistics of Forecasts by Variable Forecasted 
             
Average  19710  0.55  6.02  1.74  0.43   
Std. Dev.  8360  0.25  1.15  0.11  0.03   
Median  21258  0.60  6.00  1.79  0.43   
Maximum  26000  0.78  7.56  1.85  0.47   
Minimum  5290  0.16  4.50  1.60  0.40   





  Inter Groups Differences in Forecasts and RMSEs , 
Analysts, Guess 















           
Average  -15.60  -0.02  -0.33  0.40  0.01 
Std. Dev  -1547.89  -0.09  0.74  0.76  0.00 
Median  -758.00  0.02  0.00  0.01  0.01 
Maximum  3000.00  -0.09  0.44  1.82  0.00 
Minimum  4580.00  0.13  -1.74  0.05  0.00 
RMSE t   -1.1%  -1.2%  6.2%  33.0%  -1.3% 
           
Notes:           
None of the differences is significantly different than 0 
 31
Table 9 
    Confidence Intervals  by Subjects     
    New Rules Group, Analysts, Guess     
               
      Panel A: Confidence Intervals     
               
  NI    EPS    Share Price 
             












Prob. of  EPS 
Exceeding 
interval 
               
1  26000  32000  0.64  0.715  7.40  8.50  5.00% 
5  17000  25000  0.52  0.76  5.2  6.8  3.50% 
4  16500  24000  0.50  0.727  5  7  2.50% 
2  18135  19065  0.42  0.44  5.46  5.74  2.50% 
3  9000  9870  0.27  0.3  2.39  3.14  25.00% 
               
      Panel B: Summary Statistics     
               
Average  17327  21987  0.470  0.588  5.090  6.236  7.7% 
Std. Dev.  6042  8197  0.14  0.21  1.79  1.99  9.7% 
Median  12090  18950  0.34  0.45  3.521  6.8  5.0% 
Maximum  26000  32000  0.640  0.760  7.400  8.500  25.0% 
Minimum  9000  9870  0.270  0.300  2.390  3.140  2.5% 
Avearge Spread  4660    0.12    1.15   
Actual Values  39900    0.930    9   
 32
Table 10 
    Confidence Intervals  by Subjects     
    Old Rules Group, Analysts, Guess     
               
    Panel A: Confidence Intervals     
               
  NI  EPS  Share Price  
             












Prob. of EPS  
Exceeding 
interval 
               
1  24700  27300  0.74  0.82  5.70  6.30  20% 
5  10000  35000  0.30  1.00  3.00  6.50  na 
2  10000  30000  0.30  0.90  3.00  18.00  2.50% 
4  17358  26743  0.42  0.68  4.30  6.10  2.50% 
3  5000  10000  0.15  0.30  3.00  7.00  7.50% 
               
    Panel B: Summary Statistics  
               
Average  13412  25809  0.38  0.74  3.80  8.78  8.1% 
Std. Dev.  7698  9422  0.22  0.27  1.20  5.16  8.3% 
Median  11975  22994  0.32  0.46  3.52  6.40  5.0% 
Maximum  24700  35000  0.74  1.00  5.70  18.00  20.0% 
Minimum  5000  10000  0.15  0.30  3.00  6.10  2.5% 
Average  Spread  12397    0.36    4.98   
Actual Values  39900    0.93    9   
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Table 11 















           
Average, NRG Students  17982  0.41  4.51  1.61  0.34 
Average, NRG Analysts  19694  0.53  5.69  2.13  0.44 
Difference  -1712  -0.12  -1.18  -0.53  -0.11
** 
           
Average, ORG Students  14153  0.38  5.08  1.46  0.41 
Average, ORG Analysts  19710  0.55  6.02  1.74  0.43 
Difference  -5557  -0.17  -0.94  -0.27
*  -0.01 
 
** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10  34
Table 12 
    Forecasts, Actual Values and RMSE's of Forecasts    
  New Rules Group, Students, Sony     
            
 Panel A : Forecasts by teams     
             











Team(i)  Income  Share  Price  Ratio  Margin  RMSEi 
             
524  1400  3.000  71.500  1.020  0.330  17.29% 
512  1106  2.340  63.100  1.161  0.210  32.44% 
525  824  2.153  62.163  1.136  0.374  35.30% 
511  750  2.110  65.000  1.100  0.335  35.56% 
510  818  2.150  63.293  1.078  0.418  36.91% 
525  814  2.110  61.465  1.110  0.419  37.63% 
509  1000  2.200  64.370  1.000  0.160  37.97% 
527  700  1.808  78.000  1.095  0.227  39.25% 
507  1519  0.586  76.816  1.170  0.283  39.83% 
515  1368  0.535  71.205  0.950  0.303  41.20% 
508  1077  2.800  65.110  0.970  0.066  43.62% 
522  568  1.420  64.250  0.960  0.247  45.03% 
518  1700  0.630  79.000  1.170  0.080  51.11% 
503  1478  7.150  59.600  0.099  0.250  54.43% 
1200  1550  3.360  79.000  1.050  0.720  56.93% 
501  319  0.841  43.340  1.178  0.229  57.44% 
             
Average 
Forecast  1062  2.20  66.70  1.02  0.29  41.37% 
True Values  1708  4.20  87.45  1.06  0.32   
Average RMSE  41.37%           
             
  Panel B : Summary Statistics of Forecasts by Variable Forecasted 
             
Average  1062  2.20  66.70  1.02  0.29   
Std. Dev.  404  1.58  9.17  0.26  0.15   
Median  1039  2.13  64.69  1.09  0.27   
Maximum  1700  7.15  79.00  1.18  0.72   
Minimum  319  0.54  43.34  0.10  0.07   









 Forecasts, Actual Values, and RMSE’s of Forecasts    
                 Old  Rules Group, Students, Sony     
            
 Panel A : Forecasts by teams     
             











Team(i)  Income  Share  Price  Ratio  Margin  RMSEi 
             
413  1855  4.780  78.940  1.065  0.310  8.6% 
417  1411  3.520  69.440  0.936  0.310  15.0% 
412  2093  3.200  82.170  1.106  0.260  17.2% 
401  1508  3.025  66.800  1.025  0.295  17.6% 
403  2159  5.500  80.699  1.025  0.314  18.6% 
841  1477  3.511  59.603  0.903  0.256  20.4% 
427  2267  5.900  78.440  1.330  0.340  26.6% 
409  2737  4.530  76.820  1.140  0.283  28.4% 
424  2188  6.500  77.400  1.100  0.190  33.4% 
405  1970  4.780  76.820  1.324  0.084  36.5% 
415  1406  0.550  78.040  1.199  0.330  40.4% 
407  1700  0.610  86.000  0.920  0.100  49.4% 
418  1550  0.560  76.800  0.950  0.090  51.0% 
422  373  0.960  56.979  1.026  0.270  52.0% 
421  611  0.140  62.703  0.913  0.061  64.8% 
             
Average  1687  3.20  73.84  1.06  0.23  32.00% 
True Values  1708  4.20  87.45  1.06  0.32   
Average RMSE  32.00%           
             
  Panel B : Summary Statistics of Forecasts by Variable Forecasted 
             
Average  1687  3.20  73.84  1.06  0.23   
Std. Dev.  616  2.16  8.65  0.14  0.10   
Median  1700  3.51  76.82  1.03  0.27   
Maximum  2737  6.50  86.00  1.33  0.34   
Minimum  373  0.14  56.98  0.90  0.06   






  Inter Groups Differences in Forecasts and RMSEs ,  
Students, Sony 


















           
Average  -625.22  -1.00  -7.14  -0.05  0.06 
Std. Dev.  -212.92  -0.59  0.52  0.12  0.05 
Median  -661.45  -1.38  -12.14  0.06  0.00 
Maximum  -1037.48  0.65  -7.00  -0.15  0.38 
Minimum  -54.01  0.40  -13.64  -0.80  0.00 
RMSE t   9.3%  4.8%  7.5%  11.1%  7.0% 
P-Value  0.00  0.15  0.03  0.51  0.22 
           
Notes:           
The entries show the differences: new rules group value minus old rules 
group 














Note: The subjects had to choose the top 4 variables in terms of their importance, and 
then rank each of those four in order of importance 1-10
Sony, NRG, Ranking of Top 4 Variables in Terms of 
their Importance 
         
Total Sales      1 
Cost of goods sold      2 
Net income      3 
Past Stock prices      4 
ROE        5 
ROA        6 
Industry reports      7 
Segment Sales      8 
Liquidity        9 
Net segment profits      10 39
Table 16 
 
Sales of Sony (yen in Millions), and Rates of Growth for the Years 1997, 1998 
According to SFAS 131 (Panel A), and FAS 14 (Panel B) 
 
    Sales       Rates of growth 
             
  1996  1997  1998    1997  1998 
             
Panel A             
             
Disaggregated Segments 
(SFAS 131)             
             
Electronics  3,465,456  4,131,631  4,690,110    19.22%  13.52% 
Games  203,911  419,278  722,551    105.62%  72.33% 
Music  517,835  592,080  694,714    14.34%  17.33% 
Movies  317,580  438,554  643,164    38.09%  46.66% 
Average of the above segments  1,126,196  1,395,386  1,687,635    44.32%  37.46% 
Range of the above segments  3,261,545  3,712,353  4,046,946    91.28%  58.82% 
             
Insurance  206,903  227,934  291,068    10.16%  27.70% 
             
Total  4,711,685  5,809,477  7,041,607    23.30%  21.21% 
             
Panel B             
             
Aggregated Segments 
(FAS 14)             
             
Electronics including games  3,669,367  4,550,909  5,412,661    24.02%  18.94% 
Entertainment (Movies and Music)  835,415  1,030,634  1,337,878    23.37%  29.81% 
             
Average of the above segments  2,252,391  2,790,772  3,375,270    23.70%  24.37% 
Range of the above segments  2,833,952  3,520,275  4,074,783    0.66%  10.88% 
             
Insurance  206,903  227,934  291,068    10.16%  27.70% 
Other  273,975  240,374  248,229    -12.26%  3.27% 
             
Total  4,711,685  5,809,477 7,041,607   23.30%  21.21% 
 








The date is April 1, 1999.
17 Assume you are an analyst in the big investment bank 
“Investronics”, and you were assigned to analyze the firm “NRG”, specifically, your 
supervisor asked you to provide forecasts of the financial performance of NRG for 
1999. These forecasts usually go to the trading department of Investronics , where 
they use the forecasts either for trade or for recommendations to clients. 
To help you in the task you will receive the following documents: 
1.  Select qualitative data from the annual reports of NRG for 1997, 1998. 
2.  Select quantitative reports from NRGs’s annual reports from 1997, 1998 
3.  Relevant Industry and macroeconomic data. 
You are supposed to use the auxiliary documents to perform the forecasts.  
It is extremely important to provide accurate forecasts. Your forecasts will be 
compared to the actual variables, when these will become known. Your accuracy will 
then be compared to that of other teams who have been assigned a similar task. Each 
team that will fill the questionnaire will receive a nominal amount of cash for its 
work. In addition the six teams whose forecasts will be closest to the actual variables, 
will receive a $100 prize. 
The forecasts should be handed in to the simulation coordinator within a week from 
today. 
The following describe your task in detail: 
a.  Based on the supplements you were given, please answer the following: 
                                                 
17 In the case of Sony all periods are one year earlier.  42
1.  What was the gross profit per share in 1997 and 1998? (In $) 
2.  What was the Return on Equity (ROE) in 1997, and 1998? (in %) 
3.  What was the Return on Assets (ROA) in 1997, and 1998?(in %) 
4.  Which segment has been most profitable in 1997? In 1998? Explain 
b.  Provide the following forecasts (please use the enclosed Tables): 
1.  Total after tax earnings for 1999 (in $1000) 
2.  Per share earnings for 1999 (in $) 
3.  Average Stock Price in 1999 (in $) 
4.  Ratio of Sales/Assets (in %, 1999 average) 
5.  Profits/Sales (in %, 1999 average) 
6.  A confidence interval for the total net earnings of the firm (that is a 
range of profits such that there are 95% chances that actual profits will 
fall in this range) 
7.  A confidence interval for firm’s EPS. 
8.  A confidence interval for firm’s average stock price. 
c.  Explain shortly how you got your forecasts; 
1.  Which statistical methods did you use? 
2.  Which economic models did you use? 
3.  Which variables did you use in your calculations (please list all) 
4.  Which variables were the most important? (select 4) 
5.  What is the chance that the actual profit will exceed the upper bound 
supplied for b-6 above? 
The following questions were asked only for Sony: 
 
d. Rank the following variables in order of importance in your forecasts (in a scale 
of 1-10, 1 being the most important) 43
 
ROA 





Net segment profits 
Net profits 
ROE 
Costs of goods sold 
Segment cost of goods sold 
 
e. Rank in a scale of 1-10 the 4 variables you designated as most important in the 
question above. 
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